In die weeks following September 29, die authorities and die police carried on a deceitful campaign to exonerate diemselves and discredit die strikers. They spread die story that die strike leaders had been informed that die police intended to break up die parade, but diat diey purposely kept die miners in die dark about it They also claimed diat when die miners arrived in Estevan diey were armed with clubs and even some guns....
The events surrounding die Bienfait-Estevan strike were not at all atypical.... Governments and police and especially die RCMP automatically sided with the employers. The RCMP were used mainly to protect company property and scabs, but they were also often used to intimidate strikers by means of legal or violent acts.
There is a problem, however, widi bom Hanson's theory and die Brown's generalization regarding the relationship between die Mounted Police and labour: die RCMP records suggest a more complex picture. The material held by CSIS and die National Archives implies diat die Mounties were guilty more of incompetence dian dishonesty in their role in die Estevan Riot; die documentation also illustrates diat while die overall ideology of die Mounted Police was undoubtedly pro-capital, several Mounties sympathized with die workers or at least attempted to be balanced in tiieir judgement. These same policemen repeatedly reported that die real problem at Estevan lay widi die mine owners and managers who dirough die use of "scab" workers were deliberately attempting to provoke violence. Their reports fell on deaf ears, however, demonstrating a division between die Mounted Police at die top, who completely subscribed to die pro-capitalist/anti-communist philosophy of the federal government, and tfxwe at Estevan. This divided thinking led to a greater emphasis on the protection of private property and to the ineffective strategy of dividing the Mounted Police contingent on the day of the riot Such choices contributed to the violence of 29 September 1931.
There has been an array of interpretations regarding the relationship between the Mounted Police and labour. According to historian R.C. Macleod, the Mountie role in the 19th century was one of a neutral arbitrator while the police spent much of their time dealing with problems which arose from labour disputes they did not think of it as a special problem apart from the other problems of maintaining peace and order .... It did not occur to any of the parties involved in labour disputes that the police by intervening could be considered to be helping one class exploit another.... The police were effectively neutral in almost all labour disputes. They acted as honest broken to the general satisfaction of bom sides and as often took the part of labour as of management.
In their hagiographie account of die Royal Canadian Mounted Police, written to celebrate the centennial of the Force, Nora and William Kelly offered a brief comment on the relationship between the Mounted Police and labour, in the context of the Winnipeg General Strike:
Most of the western press spoke proudly of the Mounted Police, but the western labour press labelled diem "strikebreakers." Yet they had only acted on government orders to prevent a forbidden parade and had gathered evidence against certain men, not because they were labour leaders but because they were plotting to overthrow the government, by force if necessary. [local Mountie commander J.O.] Wilson undoubtedly considered the miners an already-advantaged group of workers who were making excessive demands, especially since many were "foreigners.'' Certainly this would be the inference the Mounties would draw from their discovery that the average daily earnings of seven prominent strikers ranged between $2.80 and $5.03 for die six months prior to the strike, some four to eight times the $.60 per day received by a RNWMP recruit at the time. Other invidious comparisons could have been drawn by the police. If miners complained of harsh treatment by the company, ordinary Mounties might have responded that it was nothing compared to the authoritarian management procedures of the RNWMP whereby fines, jail sentences, and dismissals were quite normal practices. If strikers argued the need to establish better economic conditions for their wives and children, Mounties might have noted that for most constables, marriage itself was unlikely both for financial reasons and because personnel were moved frequently. Clearly, Mounties had little sympathy for strikers.
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Baker argued, however, that the Mountie attitude was not beyond reform:
Yet there is little indication of strong police hostility toward the strikers once the initial negative stereotype had been overcome. Indeed, the Mounties did develop an independent judgement of what was required of them as witnessed, for example, by the decision in July, without consultation with company officials, to withdraw the force at the mine encampment.
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Like Lethbridge, Estevan, a small town in southeastern Saskatchewan, was blessed with natural wealth in the form of coal, in this case an abundance of lignite. Working without a union, coal miners in Estevan received lower wages than their counterparts in Alberta and British Columbia, experienced seasonal employment and injuries on the job, all the while working for employers who at the slightest complaint could tell a worker "if you don't like it, pack your tools and get out" It would appear that a strike in this district would not be so disadvantageous to the mine owners as at first sight and it would seem that they are purposely avoiding a meeting with the miners. The most energetic personality in this is Mr. Moffat [sic], who is interested in the Western Collieries and apparently in favour of forcing a strike. Information from a reliable source is to the effect that this man is using his influence with the rest of the mine operators to prevent them meeting the miners and coming to a mutual agreement to avert a strike....
The number of miners in the Estevan district will be approximately one thousand of mixed nationalities, in favour of a strong foreign element The majority of these miners are not in favour of communism, though they believe they have had unjust treatment and need a leader to guide them and air their grievances. If these had been adjusted the present situation would have been avoided. Even before die miners left the pits the mine owners and managers began to call for an armed presence to deal with any potential strikers. Undoubtedly die owners planned on employing replacement workers and recognized the conflict this might cause. The force they wanted to perform their bidding was the RCMP. The local Mounties continued to monitor the situation after the strike began on 7 September 1931. They did not, as the Browns argue, "automatically side ... with the employers." Nor were they simply there "to protect company property and scabs" or be employed as a tool to "intimidate strikers by means of legal or violent action." 20 In fact, when Sergeant Mulhall encountered a group of striking miners on 11 September be attempted to discover their grievances and even tried his hand at mediation:
It appears the bone of contention was the abrupt manner in which a reduction in the scale of wages had been made in the Spring of this year.... I pointed out that nothing could be gained by them sitting on one side of the fence and the official of the Gay Products Co. on the other making no attempt to come to some arrangement whereby a settlement might be arrived at. I suggested that they appoint a committee to meet Mr. Calvert and arrange for a meeting of the employees of the Gay Products Co. who were on strike and the Directors of the Company and at least talk things over. This they were perfectly willing to do and requested that I advise Mr. Calvert to this effect Their men appeared to be very reasonable and willing to do anything to bring the present situation to a satisfactory conclusion. After receiving their decision, I advised them to disperse which they did at once. 
Mulhall
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The RCMP displayed two main fears in its strike reports. One was die aforementioned link between die Communist Party of Canada and die MWUC and its leader, James Sloan. 26 The other was die large number of "foreigners," chiefly As the strike continued, tension grew. Mulhall believed that a particular mine manager was responsible for the increasingly dangerous situation:
In going over the situation at Taylorton, it seems that Mr. Moffatt [sic] brought in about two dozen men to act as strike breakers, the main object being to provoke the strikers to some overt act of violence thus creating a situation demanding police interference and promoting a crisis. My reason for arriving at this conclusion is that it would be impossible to work the mines at Taylorton with the number of men brought in, particularly as they were inexperienced in the work they were to be employed at Also as I have already stated no provision was made for boarding these men the cook having refused to cook meals for "scabs". Mr. Moffatt is an American with extreme ideas, who has had experience in the Pennsylvania U.S.A. strikes, when riots occurred and the miners were literally "mowed down" his attitude is that the present situation should be handled by the police in a similar manner. It has been my endeavour to handle the situation with care and patience and it is to our credit that there has been no violence or destruction of property. As long as the Producers do not attempt to start the mines I am of the opinion that there are sufficient men here to handle the situation but as soon as they attempt to start working the mines there will no doubt be serious trouble and a larger number of men will be required. I am of the opinion that the operators wish the Police to start something. It would appear that the fanners engaged by the Dom. Collieries were not sufficient to start mining operations but that all tbey did was to stir up the feelings of the strikers. Mr. Calvert in his conversation to me, stated mat if Sgt Mulhall had taken action other than he did that it might have resulted in bloodshed and also damage to property but also that it might have had a peaceable result and the strike would have now been over.
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Schutz proceeded to defend Mulhall's role in this incident and spoke to the causes behind die strike, specifically the discontent of the miners: I am satisfied that if the officers of the company had tried to put these men off of their premises at the time that they would have resisted. That the police would have then have had to step in and there is no knowing where it would have ended.... It also seems to be the general opinion that the miners that are striking have a real grievance. I have been told several times that the Officers of the H. & S. mines had a fence built around the property with die purpose of making die miners come through the gate and mat on them returning die cars were searched for articles purchased from outside stores and if they were that they were kicked over die prairie. One of the complaints of the miners of this company was that tbey were compelled to purchase at die company store at prices away [sic] in excess of ordinary prices. 
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Of course, the possibility exists that this record is also falsified. But two pieces of evidence suggest that it is not. First, it may seem strange that a record of a telephone call might exist but not when it is considered that Inspector Moorhead, before he was dispatched to Estevan from Regina, was specifically ordered to get any requests for assistance in writing. 67 There was a fear, quite correct as it would turn out, that there might be problems over responsibility for the RCMP actions at Estevan. 68 The second reason why this document is undoubtedly not falsified is Moorhead expressed die opinion that Mulhall "did not rise to the occasion, but there is no evidence that he evaded taking a share in the responsibilities placed on our men, but he evidently was not in the thick of the fight as he did not receive a bruise of any kind, which of course is not proof that he did not play his part, but it is significant that he was unable to identify any one of the rioters who attacked our men whilst several of die recruits who were in the fight gave excellent evidence of their alertness and observation made at die time." ^AC, RG 146, vol. 6, file 1025-9-91093, pt 3, Report of Metcalfe, 3 December 1931.
There is an indication that about 50* of the striken might return to work if given the opportunity by die mine owners, in which event all mines starting up would have to be carefully guarded and drastic action taken against anyone who attempted to interfere wim the workers or wim mine property.
Still the records demonstrate that at least some of the Mounties who policed events in Estevan were not simply the puppets of the mining company; they had a degree of autonomy within a framework determined by die nature of the economic and political system of die time. 74 Compared to die 1906 Ledibridge strike, die labour dispute in Estevan was remarkably free of violence with, of course, die notable exception of die riot of 29 September. This aspect, however, is ignored, in part because of a previous lack of detailed source material on die RCMP role. Such a view has also been neglected for die simple reason that die attempt at maintaining order ended widi die Mounted Police-initiated violence of 29 September, exactly what many mine owners had strived for since die strike began. Everything which came before die riot vanished in die hail of Mountie bullets and die crumpled bodies of die miners. Some of die Mounties may have briefly improvised their part in die drama which gripped Estevan during September 1931, but die mining companies had die final say on die ending.
